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Abstract
This study investigates an interplay between strategic CSR (corporate social responsibility) by a multiproduct
corporation and merger decisions by rival firms each having single plant. We examine and compare two
different timings of choosing CSR, i.e., ”merge-then-CSR” and ”CSR-then-merge” games. In the former case,
we show that the level of CSR increases in products substitutability, but its level under merger is lower than
that without merger. In the latter case where a multiproduct corporation can commit to a higher level of
CSR before rival firms’ mergers, however, the level of CSR decreases in products substitutability and it might
increase not only consumer surplus but social welfare.
Keywords: multiproduct corporation; strategic CSR; timing of commitment; products substitutability;
merger decision;
1. Introduction
As corporate social responsibility (CSR) waves are explosively expanding among the industries and soci-
eties, mostly the large firm’s voluntary engagement of CSR activities has become a global business practice.1
Accordingly, in the academic literature, research debate on the motives pushing firms to engage in CSR ac-
tivities has been also becoming increasingly prominent.2 In particular, from the profit-oriented motivations5
for adopting CSR activities, the shareholder’s viewpoint regards CSR as a strategic device of the firm’s choice
variable, which reflects management’s incentive contract to engage in business strategy. For example, strategic
Email addresses: arturo.garciam@udlap.mx (Arturo Garcia), mariellealc@tec.mx (Mariel Leal), sangho@jnu.ac.kr
(Corresponding author) (Sang-Ho Lee)
1According to the PWC Global CEO survey (2016), for example, 64% of the CEOs see CSR as a core part of their business
and 59% of them believe social values are important to attract top employees. The importance of CSR is expected to rise within
the next 5 years, and 87% of the companies become aware of the strategic dimension of societal outcome measurement. The
global phenomenon that firms concern with CSR has been also confirmed by various surveys, such as KPMG (2013, 2015) and
UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study (2010, 2013).
2Baron (2001) described two polar definitions between shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. The difference concerns
whether such CSR activities are chosen by insiders (shareholders) to achieve certain philanthropy or the levels of ethical CSR may
be given to satisfy social philanthropy. See also Benabou and Tirole (2010), Schreck (2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012),
Crifo and Forget (2015), and Kim et al. (2019).
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CSR-initiatives of consumer-friendliness enhances a firm’s reputation and image signaling concerns to increase
firm value.
Recent papers have formulated the instrumental model of strategic choice of CSR in a managerial delega-10
tion contract and seek to explain the firm’s profit-maximizing use of CSR. For instance, in a theoretical model
with strategic CSR, the firm adopts consumer surplus as its CSR concerns and puts a higher weight on output
productions to take care of consumers, which induces rivals to reduce their outputs under strategic substi-
tutes relationship.3 In recent literature, Goering (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013) and Garcia et al. (2018)
considered a bilateral model while Kopel and Brand (2012), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) and Leal et al.15
(2018) examined a horizontal competition. As further extensions, Fanti and Buccella (2016) examined net-
work effects, Fanti and Buccella (2017) and Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2020) studied the relation with entry
decisions, and Liu et al. (2015), Hirose et al. (2017) and Lee and Park (2019) incorporated environmental con-
cern. They showed that the aim of maximizing profits can be a motive for the firm’s engagement in CSR
because the adoption of CSR may increase the firm’s profits at the market equilibrium.20
However, most previous theoretical works assumed that industry consists of a few firms which hold a single
plant. In plenty of empirical works, however, multiproduct firms are regarded as realistic identities in the listed
firms data. Eckel and Neary (2010) and Armstrong and Vickers (2018) also point out that one characteristic
of current economies is the presence of multiproduct firms. In the real world, many corporations comprise firms
that produce various types of goods at various production plants. Examples include BMW, Google, Apple,25
as well as business markets for processed materials, and various types of industrial machinery. Furthermore,
multiproduct firms involve mergers. This is reflected in the recent literature on merger simulation and the
upward-pricing pressure of mergers.4 Therefore, an open question is what extent the insights derived in that
earlier literature of strategic CSR carry over to more realistic models of multiproduct firms which might invlove
mergers.30
To our knowledge, theoretical studies on market concentration to understand how multiproduct firms
strategically utilize the CSR-initiatives are limited.5 In this paper, we consider a multiproduct context and
analyze an interplay between product differentiation and strategic concern for consumers.6 We then examine
3The approach that CSR concerns account for consumer surplus is very closely related to the literature on strategic delegation
and sales targets for managers in oligopolies. Then, owners may choose non-profit maximization as the optimal managerial
incentives and include sales to commit the managers to more aggressive behavior in the output market.
4Recent works by Farrell and Shapiro (2010), Nocke and Whinston (2010, 2013) and Jaffe and Weyl (2013) have heavily in-
fluenced antitrust practice.
5Empirical studies already explored the link between CSR and firm’s profitability in mergers. See Deng et al. (2013), Flammer
(2015), and Bereskin et al. (2018) among others.
6As related studies, Moner-Colonques et al. (2004) considered delegation model with multiproduct firms and Straume (2006)
considered delegation model and merger decisions. Nocke and Schutz (2018) considered mergers between multiproduct firms with
horizontally differentiated products and showed that many of the clasic results from single product markets hold, such as mergers
2
the strategic effect of CSR by a multiproduct corporation on the merger decisions of rival firms and welfare
consequences.35
In specific, we consider a three-firm model in which a multiproduct corporate commits on CSR and com-
petes with two rival firms each having a single plant in each market. In adopting the strategic aspect of
CSR, we take the form of “consumer-friendly” activities, in which the corporate cares for consumer surplus
as a proxy of its CSR concerns and thus, a CSR-related incentive combines both profitability and consumer
surplus. In a quantity-setting framework with two-products, CSR can induce multiproduct corporation to be40
aggressive to produce more outputs, which results in the increase of intra-firm output in each market, but also
induce rival firm to reduce outputs, which results in inter-firm output interactions.
However, regarding merger decision between the rival firms, it needs to reflect different responses of output-
decreasing effect from the strategic interaction. That is, via the use of CSR, the multiproduct corporation can
not only influence its rival’s profitability but also induce them to merge if this is in the corporation’s interest.45
In that process, we highlight that products substitutability can play a key role to determine the interplay
between the profitability of a rival firm’s merger decision and the strategic CSR.7 In particular, committed
higher level of CSR can encourage a merger between rival firms, which might lead to a reduction in the total
industry outputs, depending on the products substitutability, but a higher CSR can increase a multiproduct
corporation’s production. Thus, a multiproduct firm might choose a CSR as a strategic device to induce rival50
firm’s merger and increase its profits.
Our analysis of strategic CSR can be also applied to welfare consequences of market concentration from
the merger. That is, a higher level of CSR can increase consumer surplus and thus firm’s merger decision can
be beneficial to the society in the presence of a multiproduct corporation.8
We examine the different timings of commitment to CSR, i.e., ”merge-then-CSR” and ”CSR-then-merge.”55
That is, we consider the ability of the multiproduct corporation to commit credibly to the level of CSR before
or after rival firm’s merger decisions and examine the effects of CSR on the firm’s profitability and consumer
surplus.
In the former case, we examine the case of strategic CSR after merger decisions where single plant firms
first select their decisions on merge and then the multiproduct corporation sets the degree of CSR. We show60
that products substitutability increases the strategic CSR, because fierce competition will cause aggressive
can reduce consumer surplus. However, the effect of strategic delegation with CSR by a multiproduct firm on the merger decisions
is not investigated.
7In the literature of merger policy, the profitability of merger decisions strongly depends on the degree of product differentiation.
See Lommerud and Sørgard (1997), Heywood and McGinty (2008), Hsu and Wang (2010), Gelves (2014), and Nie (2018).
8As a related paper, Garcia et al. (2020) examined an endogenous choice of mergers between a consumer-friendly multiproduct
corporation and a single product firm, and showed that mergers can increase consumer surplus and welfare under the exogenous
level of CSR by a merged firms.
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output expansion, but its level of CSR under merger is lower than that without rival firms’ merger due to the
reduced pressure of competition. We also show that both single plant firms merge when the substitutability
is high, irrespective of the level of CSR, which will always increase the profit of multiproduct corporation.
In the latter case with the reversed timing of the commitment to CSR, the multiproduct firm sets the level65
of CSR then the rival firms, taking the degree of CSR as given, choose whether to merge or not. We show that
rival firms’ decision on merger depends not only on the degree of products substitutability but the strategic
level of CSR. In particular, both single plant firms will be induced to merge when the committed CSR level
is higher than the profit-maximizing CSR level. This is because a higher level of CSR can be a threat for a
fierce competition, which brings about a higher incentive to merge. In that case, due to the reduced pressure70
of competition, the strategic CSR level is decreasing in the products substitutability and the merger decision
by rival firms also increases the profit of multiproduct corporation.
We conclude that a multiproduct corporation will commit to a higher CSR in a CSR-then-merge game as
a strategic device to induce rival firm’s merger and increase its profit especially when the substitutability is
intermediate. However, compared to the merger-then-CSR game, it can increase not only consumer surplus75
(as long as the products are not close substitutes) but social welfare. Hence, in the presence of higher CSR
by the multiproduct firm, merger in a Cournot competition can be beneficial to the firms and consumers as
well, depending on the products differentiation.
Our findings indicate the pro-competitive effects of CSR under the horizontal mergers with differentiated
products. In the literature of merger policy, horizontal merger paradox is well-known by Salant et al. (1983),80
which states that merger in a homogeneous Cournot competition can be harmful for merging firms and
consumers, but not for non-merging firms. Several studies have caught attention of researchers regarding
different and various models and resolved the merger paradox. Perry and Porter (1985) introduced convex
cost, Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) considered differentiated products, Huck et al. (2001) assumed leadership,
and Faul´ı-Oller (2002) considered cost asymmetries. More recent literature has focused on a combination85
of key factors that resolve the merger paradox. Heywood and McGinty (2008) considered convex cost and
leadership, Gelves (2010) leadership and cost asymmetries, and Hsu and Wang (2010) and Gelves (2014)
considered product differentiation and cost asymmetries. Therefore, our findings complement the literature
of horizontal merger by highlighting that under the pre-commitment on the higher CSR by a multiproduct
corporation, merger between Cournot competitors can be beneficial to the firms and consumers as well.90
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a quantity-setting multi-
product model with a consumer-friendly multiproduct corporation. In section 3, we analyze output decisions
by single plant firms under non-merged case and under merged case, respectively. We then consider merger
decisions in a merge-then-CSR game and in a CSR-then-merge game, respectively, in section 4 and 5. In
section 6, we compare the two games and provide main findings on the relationship between CSR and merger.95
We conclude the paper in section 7.
4
2. Model
We consider two differentiated products markets with a CSR-corporation, A, which has two plants and
produces goods in market 1 and 2, denoted by A1 and A2, respectively, and two single plant for-profit (FP)
firms in each market, denoted by B1, and B2, respectively. When firm B1 and firm B2 merge (or when one100
of them acquires the other), we assume that they can reorganize their organizational structure by setting up
a multiproduct corporation after the merger, which has two divisions/plants, each producing one goods.
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. The representative consumer
has a utility function U(q1, q2), which is quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q1 and q2: U(q1, q2) =
(q1+q2)− ((q
2
1+2γq1q2+q
2
2))/2, where γ represents the degree of product differentiation and qki is the output
produced by firm or plant ki, k = A,B; i = 1, 2. Then, the consumer maximizes U(q1, q2)−p1q1−p2q2, where
pi is the price of good i, q1 = qA1+ qB1 and q2 = qA2+ qB2 are the quantity of good 1 and 2 respectively. The
inverse demand functions are linear and given by:
pi = 1− (qAi + qBi)− γ(qAj + qBj), i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2; (1)
where parameter9 γ ∈ (0, 1] and thus products are regarded as homogeneous products if γ = 1 while indepen-
dent if γ approaches 0.
On the supply side, we assume that firms have identical technologies represented by the following quadratic
cost function: C(qki) =
q2
ki
2 , k = A,B; i = 1, 2. Thus, the profit function of a plant or firm ki is:
πki = piqki −
q2ki
2
, k = A,B; i = 1, 2 (2)
and the profit of the multiplant CSR-corporation is:
πA = πA1 + πA2 (3)
We consider a managerial delegation model of the CSR-corporation, in which the owner and the manager
are separated. To maximize the joint profits in (3), the owner of CSR-corporation specifies an incentive
contract with the manager. In specific, the manager is assumed to maximize the joint profits of its two plants
plus a fraction (θ) of consumer surplus (CS) in production, which is determined by the owner. Thus, the
objective function of the manager of CSR-corporation is given by:
V = πA + θCS (4)
9Note that the substitutability can play an important role in the profitability of merger decisions in the literature, such as
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Lommerud and Sørgard (1997), Heywood and McGinty (2008), Hsu and Wang (2010), Gelves
(2014), and Nie (2018). In appendix B, we allow for the complements case where γ ∈ (−1, 0) and find that competition with
complements always yields profitable mergers. Thus, the timing of strategic CSR does not change the merger decisions of FP
firms with complementary products.
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where CS = ((qA1 + qB1)
2 + 2γ(qA1 + qB1)(qA2 + qB2) + (qA2 + qB2)
2)/2. Note that parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]105
measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus when the corporation adopts CSR activities, i.e., the
level of CSR.
The FP firms can decide to merge and set up a multiproduct firm with two divisions, 1 and 2. If they
merge, the profit of the multiplant FP-corporation is:
πB = πB1 + πB2 (5)
Our goal is to study the profit-motivated decision to merge by FP firms and understand how the strategic
CSR works as an inducement device toward FP firm’s merge decision. When FP firms can voluntarily decide
to merge under the profit-incentive compatible constraint, we will consider and compare two scenarios: (i)110
merger-then-CSR game and (ii) CSR-then-merger game. Under scenario (i), the FP firms decide whether to
merge and set up a multiproduct firm in the first stage. In the second stage, a CSR corporation determines
its degree of CSR. That is, the strategic choice of CSR by a multiproduct CSR firm is arranged in the second
stage. Then, firms compete with outputs in the last stage. Under scenario (ii), however, a CSR corporation
moves first and determines its level of CSR in the first stage. Then, the FP firms decide whether to merge115
and set up a multiproduct firm in the second stage. In the last stage, firms compete with outputs.
Finally, we will compare the profits of a CSR corporation between the two scenarios (i) and (ii), and provide
the profit-incentive of CSR. In particular, we will provide a condition of product differentiation in which the
CSR corporation can increase its profit under the scenario (ii) where the commitment to CSR can encourage
the rival FP firm’s merger decision. We also investigate the welfare consequences of strategic commitment to120
CSR in scenario (ii).
3. Analysis of output stage
In the last stage, we solve equilibrium output decisions of the games. Given that FP firms will decide
whether to merge or not, we have two cases in each scenario. In the first non-merger case, FP firms do not
merge, in which a CSR-corporation competes with 2 independent FP firms, which will be denoted by the125
superscript ⋆ . In the second merger case, firms merge and set up a multiproduct corporation, in which a
CSR-corporation competes with a FP-corporation, which will be denoted by the superscript †.
3.1. CSR-corp. competes with 2 independent FP firms
First, we consider the non-merger case when there is a CSR-corporation competing with 2 single plant FP
firms. The manager of the CSR-corporation A chooses the outputs qA1 and qA2 that maximise eqn. (4). FP130
firm Bi chooses the output qBi that maximises its profit given by eqn. (2), respectively.
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Hence, the equilibrium of the third stage of the game (the output game) must satisfy:
∂V
∂qAi
= 1− (3− θ)qAi − 2γqAj − qBi − γqBj + θ (qBi + γ (qBj + qAj)) = 0
∂πBi
∂qBi
= 1− 3qBi − qAi − γqAj − γqBj = 0 (6)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. From (6), we obtain the reaction functions
qAi =
1− 2γqAj − qBi − γqBj + θ (qBi + γ (qBj + qAj))
3− θ
qBi =
1
3
(1− qAi − γqAj − γqBj) (7)
From (7), it is easy to see that output of CSR-corp. A (qAi, i = 1, 2) decreases with that of FP firm
Bi, and the output produced by one plant of CSR-corp. A decreases with that of the other, i.e. outputs are
strategic substitutes. Solving them, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. When a CSR-corp. competes with 2 single plant FP firms, the outputs and profits are
q⋆Ai =
2 + θ(1 + γ)
8 + 7γ + γ2 − 2θ(1 + γ)
, q⋆Bi =
2− θ(1 + γ) + γ
8 + 7γ + γ2 − 2(1 + γ)θ
π⋆A =
(2 + θ(1 + γ))(6 + 4γ − 5θ(1 + γ))
(8 + 7γ + γ2 − 2θ(1 + γ))
2 , π
⋆
Bi =
3(2 + γ − (1 + γ)θ)2
2 (8 + 7γ + γ2 − 2θ(1 + γ))
2 i = 1, 2
From Lemma 1 we have that
∂q⋆
Ai
∂θ
> 0,
∂q⋆
Bi
∂θ
< 0 and
∂q⋆
i
∂θ
> 0 where qi = qAi + qBi. Then, from last135
inequality, we have that the market output always increases with CSR effort. Furthermore,
∂q⋆
Ai
∂γ
< 0 and
∂q⋆
Bi
∂γ
< 0. Note also that the level of CSR decreases rival firm’s profit whereas the products substitutability
decreases all firms’ profits because of fierce competition. That is,
∂π⋆
A
∂θ
>
<
0 if θ<
>
2(1+γ)
11+5γ and
∂π⋆
Bi
∂θ
< 0 whereas
∂π⋆
A
∂γ
< 0 and
∂π⋆
Bi
∂γ
< 0.
3.2. CSR-corp. competes with a merged FP-corp.140
Now we consider the merger case when the two FP firms merge and set up a multiproduct FP-corp. that
chooses the values of qB1 and qB2 that maximize (5). Hence, the equilibrium of the third stage of the game
must satisfy:
∂V
∂qAi
= 0 and
∂πB
∂qBi
= 0 (8)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. From (8), we obtain the reaction functions
qAi =
1− 2γqAj − qBi − γqBj + θ (qBi + γ (qBj + qAj))
3− θ
qBi =
1
3
(1− qAi − γqAj − 2γqBj) (9)
After the usual calculations, one gets:
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Lemma 2. When a CSR-corp. competes with a merged FP-corp., the outputs and profits are
q†Ai =
2 + θ(1 + γ) + γ
(2 + γ)(4 + 3γ − (1 + γ)θ)
, q†Bi =
2− θ(1 + γ) + γ
(2 + γ)(4 + 3γ − (1 + γ)θ)
π†A =
(
6 + 7γ + 2γ2 −
(
5 + 7γ + 2γ2
)
θ
)
(2 + γ + (1 + γ)θ)
(2 + γ)2(4 + 3γ − (1 + γ)θ)2
, π†B =
(3 + 2γ)(2 + γ − (1 + γ)θ)2
(2 + γ)2(4 + 3γ − (1 + γ)θ)2
i = 1, 2
From Lemma 2 we have that
∂q
†
Ai
∂θ
> 0,
∂q
†
Bi
∂θ
< 0 and
∂q
†
i
∂θ
> 0. Then, from last inequality, we have that
the market output always increases with CSR effort. Furthermore,
∂q
†
Ai
∂γ
< 0 and
∂q
†
Bi
∂γ
< 0. Note also that the
level of CSR decreases rival firm’s profit while the products substitutability decreases all firms’ profits. That
is,
∂π
†
A
∂θ
>
<
0 if θ<
>
2+3γ+γ2
11+12γ+3γ2 and
∂π
†
B
∂θ
< 0 whereas
∂π
†
A
∂γ
< 0 and
∂π
†
B
∂γ
< 0.145
In the below, we examine a merger-then-CSR game and a CSR-then-merger game, respectively, depending
on the two cases that FP firms will decide whether to merge or not.
4. Analysis of Merge-then-CSR Game: MC Case
In the second stage of this game, the owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize its profits. We
need to consider both non-merger and merger cases, respectively, given in the output stage.150
4.1. CSR-corp. competes with 2 independent FP firms
The owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3), that is, according to
∂π∗
A
∂θ
= 0, we obtain
the following result:
Lemma 3. In a merge-then-CSR game, when a CSR-corp. competes with 2 single plant FP firms:
θ⋆MC =
2(1 + γ)
11 + 5γ
; q⋆MCAi =
2
7 + 5γ
; q⋆MCBi =
5 + 3γ
21 + 22γ + 5γ2
π⋆MCA =
4
21 + 22γ + 5γ2
; π⋆MCBi =
3(5 + 3γ)2
2 (21 + 22γ + 5γ2)
2 i = 1, 2
CS⋆MC =
(1 + γ)(11 + 5γ)2
(21 + 22γ + 5γ2)
2 ; W
⋆MC =
280 + 409γ + 182γ2 + 25γ3
(21 + 22γ + 5γ2)
2
Note from Lemma 3 that dθ
⋆MC
dγ
> 0 and d
2θ⋆MC
dγ2
< 0. It means that the CSR monotonically increases with
the degree of substitution, and this effect is weakened as the degree of substitution increases. This indicates155
that the aggressiveness of a CSR-corp. in production via a higher CSR is stronger under fierce competition
with rival firms. Furthermore, q⋆MCAi ≥ q
⋆MC
Bi for any γ ∈ (0, 1].
4.2. CSR-corp. competes with a merged FP-corp.
The owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3), that is, according to
∂π
†
A
∂θ
= 0, we get:
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Lemma 4. In a merge-then-CSR game, when a CSR-corp. competes with a merged FP-corp:
θ†MC =
2 + 3γ + γ2
11 + 12γ + 3γ2
; q†MCAi =
2 + γ
7 + 8γ + 2γ2
; q†MCBi =
5 + 5γ + γ2
(3 + 2γ) (7 + 8γ + 2γ2)
π†MCA =
(2 + γ)2
(3 + 2γ) (7 + 8γ + 2γ2)
; π†MCB =
(
5 + 5γ + γ2
)2
(3 + 2γ) (7 + 8γ + 2γ2)
2
CS†MC =
(1 + γ)
(
11 + 12γ + 3γ2
)2
((3 + 2γ) (7 + 8γ + 2γ2))
2 ; W
†MC =
280 + 821γ + 940γ2 + 524γ3 + 142γ4 + 15γ5
((3 + 2γ) (7 + 8γ + 2γ2))
2 (10)
Note from Lemma 4 that dθ
†MC
dγ
> 0 and d
2θ†MC
dγ2
< 0. It also means that the CSR monotonically increases160
with the degree of substitution, and this effect is weakened as the degree of substitution increases. This also
indicates that the aggressiveness of a CSR-corp. in production via a higher CSR is stronger under fierce
competition with rival firms. Furthermore, q†MCAi > q
†MC
Bi for any γ ∈ (0, 1].
4.3. FP firms’ merger decisions in the first stage
Lemma 5. Comparing the two cases in a merge-then-CSR game, we have the following results:10165
(i) θ⋆MC > θ†MC
(ii) q⋆MCA1 + q
⋆MC
A2 < q
†MC
A1 + q
†MC
A2 , q
⋆MC
B1 + q
⋆MC
B2 > q
†MC
B1 + q
†MC
B2 and Q
⋆MC > Q†MC
(iii) CS⋆MC > CS†MC
(iv) W ⋆MC > W †MC
Lemma 5 in a merge-then-CSR game states that (i) the strategic level of CSR under independent rivals is170
higher than that under rival firms’ merger. Thus, merger decision by FP firms reduce the aggressive production
of CSR-corp. Then, it is shown that (ii) CSR-corp. can increase its output from rivals’ merger whereas rival
firms’ outputs and industry outputs decrease after their merger. It represents that both its output-increasing
effect of the CSR-corp. and market price-increasing effect from the reduction of total market outputs provide
a beneficial effect to the profit profile of CSR-corp. Finally, both the level of consumer surplus and social175
welfare under independent rivals are higher than those under rival firms’ merger.
Proposition 1. In a merge-then-CSR game, products substitutability can increase CSR, but the strategic level
of CSR under merger is lower than that without merger.
In the first stage, we shall now analyze whether FP firms want to merge and set up a multiproduct FP-
corporation. They will accept the merger if the profit that they will obtain in the multiproduct firm,
π
†MC
B
2 , is180
greater than the profit obtained when competing as 2 single plant FP firms, π⋆MCBi i = 1, 2. Let γ¯ denote the
value of parameter γ such that π⋆MCBi =
π
†MC
B
2 .
10In appendix A, we provide the proofs of lemmas and propositions.
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Proposition 2. In a merge-then-CSR game, merged FP firms could generate more profit than non-merged
FP firms when CSR-corp. products are close substitutes. That is π⋆MCBi
<
>
π
†MC
B
2 if γ
>
<
γ¯ ≈ 0.883.
Proposition 2 states that both FP firms will merge when products are close substitutes while they prefer185
to stay as single plant FP firms when products are highly differentiated. It complements the findings in the
previous literature of merger paradox, such as Lommerud and Sørgard (1997), Heywood and McGinty (2008),
Hsu and Wang (2010), Gelves (2014), and Nie (2018) who showed that mergers are more likely to be profitable
when differentiation is high. It produces the following proposition under merge-then-CSR game:
Proposition 3. In a merge-then-CSR game, CSR-corporation prefers to compete with a multiproduct FP-190
corporation rather than compete with 2 single plant FP firms. That is π⋆MCA < π
†MC
A .
It implies that the necessary condition of rival firms’ merger decision in Proposition 2, which is independent
of the level of CSR, is sufficient to support the merger equilibrium of this game. In the absence of CSR, for
example, Proposition 3 and Lemma 5(iv) support the previous findings in the literature that outsiders always
benefit more when excluded from the merger, but welfare always decreases after the merger.195
5. Analysis of CSR-then-Merge Game: CM Case
As in the MC case the equilibrium outputs of the third stage are the same. The second stage of this
game consists on the FP firms decision whether to merge or not. This case implies that the CSR corp. can
pre-commit to its level of CSR before the FP firms choose their merger decision. If both FP firms admit this
commitment to CSR is credible, they will treat CSR as an exogenous variable.200
5.1. FP firms’ merger decisions in the second stage
From Lemma 1 and 2, they will accept the merger if the profit that they will obtain in the multiproduct
firm,
π
†
B
2 =
π
†CM
B
2 , is greater than the profit obtained when competing as 2 single plant FP firms, π
⋆
Bi =
π⋆CMBi i = 1, 2; where superscript CM stands for ‘CSR-then-Merge’. Let θ¯ denote the value of parameter θ
such that π⋆CMBi =
π
†CM
B
2 :
θ¯(γ) =
10 + 14γ + 5γ2
(1 + γ)(4 + 3γ)
−
√
3 (12 + 20γ + 11γ2 + 2γ3)
(4 + 3γ)2
Proposition 4. In a CSR-then-merge game, merged FP firms could generate more profit than non-merged
FP firms when the level of CSR is large. That is π⋆CMBi
<
>
π
†CM
B
2 if θ
>
<
θ¯(γ) ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, only when the CSR is high, merger decision is profitable to the FP firms. Note that if we compare
the profits of the CSR-corp. in Lemma 1 and 2, we obtain that π⋆A < π
†
A for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1]. This205
means that CSR-corp. prefers to compete with a multiproduct FP-corp. rather than compete with 2 single
plant FP firms as far as the level of CSR is the same.
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5.2. CSR decision by a CSR-Corp. in the first stage
In the first stage, the owner of CSR-corporation can commit to its level of CSR, expecting the merger
decisions in the second stage, which depends on parameter θ. Then, it chooses θ to maximize (3) in each case.210
From Figure 1, we have the following two cases:11
First, when the FP firms do not merge in the second stage, where θ ≤ θ¯(γ), then CSR-corp. chooses
θ⋆CM = θ⋆MC . Then, the profit that CSR-corp. obtains is π⋆CMA = π
⋆MC
A =
4
21+22γ+5γ2 . However, when the
FP firms merge in the second stage, where θ ≥ θ¯(γ), then CSR-corp. chooses θ¯, that is, θ†CM = θ¯. Then, the
profit that CSR-corp. obtains is π†A(θ¯) = π
†CM
A at equilibrium. It is noteworthy that the profit of CSR-corp.215
from CSR-then-merge case is lower than that obtained from merge-then-CSR case, i.e., π†CMA < π
†
A(θ
†MC) =
π†MCA .
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
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θ★MC
θ†MC
Figure 1: CSR and merger decisions
Lemma 6. Comparing the two cases in a CSR-then-merge game, we have the following results:
(i) θ⋆CM < θ†CM .
(ii) q⋆CMA1 + q
⋆CM
A2 < q
†CM
A1 + q
†CM
A2 , q
⋆CM
B1 + q
⋆CM
B2 > q
†CM
B1 + q
†CM
B2 and Q
⋆CM >
<
Q†CM if γ>
<
γ1 ≈ 0.852, which220
denotes the value of parameter γ such that Q⋆CM = Q†(θ¯).
(iii)CS⋆CM >
<
CS†CM if γ>
<
γ1.
(iii) W ⋆CM > W †CM .
11In Figure 1, we can show that θ⋆MC < θ¯(γ) and from Lemma 1 we obtain that
∂π⋆
A
∂θ
>
<
0 if θ<
>
2(1+γ)
11+5γ
= θ⋆MC . Also, we can
show that θ†MC < θ¯(γ) and from Lemma 2 we obtain that
∂π
†
A
∂θ
>
<
0 if θ<
>
2+3γ+γ2
11+12γ+3γ2
= θ†MC .
11
Lemma 6 in a CSR-then-merge game states that (i) CSR-corp. will set a higher level of CSR for inducing
rival firm’s merger than that under independent rivals. Then, due to the aggressive production of the CSR-225
corp. two FP firms decide to merge and reduce their outputs in order to lessen competition. Note that
the strategic level of CSR is decreasing in product differentiation. That is, when the products are highly
substitutes and thus fierce competition emerges, two FP firms have a more incentive to merge and thus the
CSR-corp. can set a lower level of CSR. Thus, (ii) CSR-corp. can increase its outputs from rivals’ merger
whereas rival firms’ outputs decrease after their merger. However, the change of total outputs depends on the230
degree of product differentiation, i.e., (iii) consumer surplus under independent rivals is higher (lower) than
that under rival firms’ merger when the products are (less) close substitutes. However, (iv) social welfare
under independent rivals is higher than that under rival firms’ merger.
Proposition 5. In a CSR-then-merge game, strategic CSR by a multiproduct corporation is higher than that
in a merge-then-CSR game, but the level of CSR decreases in products substitutability.235
Now, let γˆ such that π⋆CMA = π
†CM
A . Then, π
⋆CM
A
<
>
π†CMA if γ
>
<
γˆ ≈ 0.573.
Proposition 6. In a CSR-then-merge game, CSR-corporation prefers to compete with a merged multiprod-
uct FP-corporation if product are highly substitutes. Otherwise, CSR-corporation prefers to compete with 2
independent FP firms.
It implies that the necessary condition of rival firms’ merger decision in Proposition 4, which depends on240
the level of CSR, is not sufficient to support the merger equilibrium of this game. Only when the products
are highly substitutes, merger decision is profitable to a CSR-corp. and social desirable.
6. Effects of the commitment to CSR
In this section, we proceed to investigate whether the CSR corp. will choose scenario (i) or (ii), i.e., whether
it will move first or second in determining its strategic level of CSR. Then, we need to compare the profits245
of CSR corp. between merge-then-CSR case and CSR-then-merge case. We also further analyze the welfare
effects of the commitment to strategic CSR in a scenario (ii).
On one hand, from Lemma 3, 4 and Proposition 2, we have that: FP firms will not merge if γ < γ¯ ≈ 0.883
while they merge if γ > γ¯. Then, CSR-corp. sets θ⋆MC if γ < γ¯ while it sets θ†MC if γ > γ¯, which will increase
the profit of both CSR-corporation and FP-corporation. On the other hand, from Propositions 4 and 6, we250
have that: FP firms will not merge if θ < θ¯ while they merge if θ > θ¯. Furthermore, CSR-corp. will set θ⋆CM
if γ < γˆ ≈ 0.573 while it sets θ¯ if γ > γˆ.
Hence, we can summarize the following findings from Figure 2:
a) If γ < γˆ, CSR-corp. might want FP firms to merge under scenario (i), but it is not in FP firms inter-
ests. Thus, CSR-corp. sets θ⋆MC = θ⋆CM . In that region, the strategic CSR level is increasing in the255
substitutability of the products.
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b) If γˆ < γ < γ¯, CSR-corp. still wants FP firms to merge under scenario (i) but it is not in FP firms interests.
However, in this region, CSR-corp. would commit to a higher level of CSR in advance and set θ¯ in scenario
(ii). In that region, the strategic CSR level is very high but it is decreasing in the substitutability of the
products.260
c) If γ > γ¯, CSR-corp. wants FP firms to merge in (i), which is in FP firms interests. Thus, CSR-corp. sets
θ†MC . In that region, the strategic CSR level is increasing in the substitutability of the products.
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Figure 2: CSR and the profits of CSR-corporation
Therefore, knowing that CSR-corp. can not obtain higher profit that will come from rival’s merger under
a merge-then-CSR game when γ < 0.883, the CSR-corp. has the interest to commit to the strategic CSR level
before rival firms’ choose merger decision. In particular, when the products substitutability is intermediate,265
i.e., γˆ < γ < γ¯, it is profitable for the multiproduct corp. to commit to a higher level of CSR, θ¯, in a CSR-
then-merge game, which is a higher level than θ†MC . Note that merger decision by rival firms increases the
profit of multiproduct corporation larger than that under the no-merger case.
Proposition 7. When the products substitutability is intermediate, the multiproduct CSR-corp. will commit
to a higher level of strategic CSR.270
Finally, we now compare the effects of commitment to a higher CSR on consumer surplus and social welfare.
Lemma 7. Comparing the merger outcomes between CSR-then-merge and merge-then-CSR games, we have
the following results:
(i) CS†CM > CS†MC for any γ ∈ (0, 1)275
(ii) Let γ2 denote the value of γ such that W
†MC =W †CM . Then, W †MC >
<
W †CM if γ<
>
γ2 ≈ 0.262
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It states that when FP firms merge, consumer surplus under a merge-then-CSR game is higher than that
under a CSR-then-merge game while social welfare is only when products are highly differentiated. Otherwise,
the social welfare under a CSR-then-merge game is higher.
Summing up the lemmas in 5, 6 and 7, we have the following results in Figure 3.280
Proposition 8. In a CSR-then-merge game, strategic commitment to a higher CSR by a multi-product cor-
poration can increase not only consumer surplus (as long as products are not close substitutes) but social
welfare.
Therefore, the preemption of strategic CSR that induces rival firms to merge can be not only profitable to
the multiproduct corp. but beneficial to the society. This indicates the pro-competitive effects of CSR under285
horizontal mergers.
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Figure 3: Consumer surplus and welfare
7. Concluding Remarks
We considered a multiproducts model in which a multiproduct CSR-corporation competes with a rival
firm having single plant in each market, and analyzed the interplay between the strategic choice of CSR by a290
CSR-corporation and merger incentives of rival firms. We examined the ability of commitment to the level of
CSR before or after rival firm’s merger decisions in the different timings of CSR, and investigated the effects
of preemptive CSR on the firm’s profitability and social welfare.
We showed that CSR can induce multiproduct corporation to be aggressive to produce more outputs, which
results in intra-firm substitution, but also induce single plant rival firm to merge and reduce outputs, which295
14
results in inter-firm substitution. Thus, the substitutability of the products can play a key role to determine
not only the profitability of a rival firm’s merger decision but the strategic timing of CSR level of a CSR-
corporation. We then showed that a merger might lead to a reduction in the total industry outputs and thus
it is profitable to both merged firms even though CSR-initiatives increase a CSR-corp.’s production. However,
a multiproduct corp. can commit to a higher CSR level as a strategic device to induce rival firm’s merger and300
increase its profits especially when the substitutability is intermediate. Compared to the merger-then-CSR
game, the preemption of strategic CSR can increase not only consumer surplus (as long as the products are
not close substitutes) but social welfare. This finding highlights the pro-competitive effects of CSR under the
horizontal mergers. That is. in the presence of higher CSR by a multiproduct firm, rival firms’ merger in a
Cournot competition can be beneficial to the firms and consumers as well.305
There remain some limitations of our analysis. We considered an asymmetric case that only a multiproduct-
corp. adopts CSR but rival firms are pure profit-maximizers. We can extend the analysis into an endogenous
choice model where all firms decide whether to choose CSR or not.12 We also adopted a managerial delegation
model as an indirect device of strategic CSR-initiatives. In reality, however, the credibility of the commit-
ment to CSR depends on the signaling effect of actual CSR activities. For example, if a multiproduct corp.310
should take an irreversible investment to commit to a higher CSR, analytic consideration on the cost effect
of CSR investment might be an important factor for choosing a strategic device. Furthermore, if the com-
mitment to (costless) CSR activities are not credible, the firm might want to invest in product R&D, which
change the characteristics of the products or upgrade the quality of products, which can affect the products
substitutability. These are future research directions for real practice in CSR activities.315
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